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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-FoREIGN

CORPORATIONS-SUBSTITUTED

SERVICE-DuE

PROCESS.-A foreign corporation lawfully authorized to transact business in the
state filed notice and withdrew. A claimant predicating his cause of action on
transactions arising prior to the corporation's withdrawal obtained jurisdiction
by service on the secretary of state under a statute providing therefor in the
event that the corporation revoked the authority of its resident agent prior to the
running of the statute of limitations. The statute in question did not require the
secretary of state or the complaining party to give notice of the action to the
corporation. (Rem. Comp. Stat. Wash. Sec. 3854). The corporation appeared
specially and moved to quash the service. The motion was overruled. From a
judgment of the state supreme court refusing a writ of prohibition to restrain
the trial court from consideration on the grounds of improper service, the corporation appealed. Held, that the service is effective as the statute is constitutional and does not deny due process. Judgment affirmed. State of Washington
ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Washington for Spokane County, et al., 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. Ed. 786 (1933).
Statutes providing for the service on an official of the state and providing
for notice in some manner to the non-resident motorist defendant have been
held constitutional as affording due process. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47
Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927) ; Cleary v. Johnston, 79 N.J.L. 49, 74 Atl. 538
(1909) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916) ;
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 192 Wis. 145, 211 N.W. 916,
57 A.L.R. 1218 (1927); see Scott, "Jurisdiction Over Non-resident Motorists,"
39 Har. Law Rev. 563 (1926). But a similar statute not providing for notice in
any manner was held unconstitutional. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 Sup.
Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446, 57 A.L.R. 1230 (1928). That there was no reasonable
probability of the non-resident motorist becoming aware of the action is the
basis for declaring the latter statute void. The intant case distinguishes between
foreign corporations and non-resident motorists upon the ground that the state
may exclude the corporation altogether from doing business in the state and
consequently condition its entrance into the state. This power of exclusion and
conditioning of entrance is limited by the constitutional rights of foreign corporations. 17 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations (1933) page 237-238, also cases
collected in footnote 34? page 243; see 19 Yale Law Jour. 1 (1904). But on
the other hand the state is not compelled to construct highways, thereby effectively excluding the non-resident motorists. Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 144
N.E. 760, 35 A.L.R. 945 (1924). Further, the state may regulate the use of its
highways to the extent of utter prohibition unless and until licensed. Kane v.
New Jersey, supra; Cleary v. Johnston, supra; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S.
610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1914). The valid statutes concerning nonresident motorists place a burden upon the claimant or upon the state official
to do some affirmative act by way of notice to the defendant of the action.
In the instant case it is said that by maintaining an agent in the state after lawful cessation of business the corporation could assure itself of notice. Such an
act by the corporation provides the reasonable probability of notice necessary to
insure due process. This reasonable probability is the essence of justice. Due
-process of law implies a conformity with natural and inherent principles of
justice. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780, 790
.(1897). Why on one class of non-resident defendants falls the burden of supplying this essence and on the other class it does not fall, is an interesting matter for speculation.
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